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Introduction
Enhancements come in many shapes and forms: physical enhancements, 
cognitive enhancements, emotional enhancements, and, there is even a new 
kid on the block, moral enhancements (see Persson and Savulescu 2008; 
Douglas 2008). It is, however, the issue of cognitive enhancement that really 
gets the debate going. The controversy created by the commentary “Profes-
sor’s Little Helper” in Nature at the end of last year is an illustration of this 
point. It is a piece that is ostensibly about the increasingly common “off-label 
and non-prescription” uses of drugs such as methylphenidate (ritalin) and 
modafinil (Provigil) (Sahakian and Morein-Zamir 2007, 1157). Nonetheless, 
reading the ensuing news stories and online comments one could be forgiven 
for thinking that the article was solely about the use of cognitive-enhancing 
drugs by ailing university professors and students desperate to gain an aca-
demic edge.
While not yet a professor (I am instead a “lecturer”), and I hope not yet 
ailing, I was intrigued by the commentary and some of the ensuing re-
sponses to it. As pointed out by Bernard Prusak in his introduction to this 
controversy, the concerns arising often focus on issues of “safety…, fairness 
and justice…, coercive pressure…, whether the use of such drugs is in fact 
unprecedented…, and…whether pharmacological enhancements are differ-
ent in a morally significant way from more mundane forms of life-enhanc-
ers.” All of these concerns are generally raised in an attempt to answer the 
question of whether or not a particular type of enhancement, or means of 
achieving that enhancement, is morally permissible. Here, however, I do not 
want to look at whether cognitive enhancement by chemical means is permis-
sible or not. This has been dealt with at length elsewhere (see Harris 2007; 
rose 2006; and Sandel 2007). For the purposes of this article, I am going to 
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start with the premise that a competent individual crosses no moral boundary 
when voluntarily choosing to take drugs such as ritalin and Provigil purely 
for the purposes of augmenting cognitive abilities. From this premise that 
cognitive enhancement by chemical means is morally permissible, I am going 
to take the argument one step further and suggest that, for academics at least, 
there might even be a moral duty to do so. Although I am sure there will be 
many objections to this suggestion, I will start by addressing just one possible 
objection, and I will then move on to sketch out an argument in support of 
the contention that academics might be under an obligation to take steps to 
cognitively enhance themselves.
Academia, Sport, and the Ethics of Cheating
The possible objection that I have in mind is that it is cheating to use cogni-
tive enhancing drugs. This objection can be found implicitly in an article 
entitled “Brain Enhancement is Wrong, right?” by Benedict Carey in the 
New York Times. In it, he says:
So far no one is demanding that asterisks be attached to Nobels,  
Pulitzers or Lasker awards. government agents have not been raid-
ing anthropology departments, riffling book bags, testing professors’ 
urine. And if there are illicit trainers on campuses, shady tutors with 
wraparound sunglasses and ties to basement labs in Italy, no one has 
exposed them. (Carey 2008)
The analogy here is, of course, with doping in sport. The implicit accusa-
tion is that academics who take drugs to enhance certain aspects of their 
cognitive function are cheating. Thomas Douglas points out “[e]nhancement 
in sport and enhancement outside of sport are often discussed in parallel” 
(Douglas 2007); but, if you will excuse the pun, these two playing fields are 
not the same. Academia and sport operate under different sets of rules and 
have different sets of expectations placed upon them.
In the context of sport, Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu point out that 
“doping is the most widespread method of cheating” (Foddy and Savules-
cu 2007). Cheating it most certainly is, but the reason that the taking of 
enhancement type drugs is cheating in this context is because of the rules of 
the game that athletes are playing. Whatever the particular sport that indi-
vidual athletes take part in, they are engaging in that sport at a competitive 
level which has preset criteria for their participation. One of those criteria is 
that competitors do not take certain chemical substances. This is the deal that 
they must agree to. As a result, if individual athletes choose to take banned 
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substances, they are contravening both the rules and the ideals of fair play and 
sportsmanship (see further Douglas 2007). If, however, the rules changed and 
these banned substances were permitted, then taking these substances would 
no longer be cheating.
The equivalent situation in the academic context is, perhaps, that of stu-
dents taking drugs in order to perform well on examinations. yet even in 
this situation, the accusation of cheating can only be levelled in virtue of the 
rules of the game. If the rules are such that they prohibit the use of chemical 
enhancers, or at least certain classes of them, then it would be wrong to use 
them in that particular circumstance. We are, however, free to change the rules 
and permit the use of enhancers; if we were to do so, this use would no longer 
be cheating. This is true whether we are talking about education or sport.
Of course, if we were to allow the use of these enhancers—for the sake of 
argument, let’s say modafinil—it might well be the case that students would 
either choose not to use them or find that they could not afford them.1 Such 
inequality is not, however, an argument in itself for proving that the use 
of modafinil by students should not be permitted. After all, there are other 
enhancement type technologies out there that students choose not to use or 
cannot afford: for example, availing of a private tutor. If enhancements are 
ever to be deemed morally problematic, then the problem will be not the 
enhancements themselves, but the context in which they are used.
Despite the obvious similarities between cheating in an examination-type 
situation and cheating in sport, no such equivalence exists for those of us who 
work as academics. There might be a resemblance in so far as there is definite-
ly an element of competition in academia, but this is where the comparison 
must end. While I was quite tickled by Carey’s notion of university campuses 
being raided to test professors for illicit substances, the level playing field is 
not the paradigm upon which academia is built. Far from it, academia in fact 
encourages the participants in the academic game to excel, push the bounds 
of knowledge, and stand out from their fellows. And we reward those who do 
so with promotion, large research grants, and prizes such as “Nobels, Pulitzers 
or Laskers” (Carey 2008). So perhaps the enhancement of cognitive abilities 
is not inimical to the role of an academic, but actually a requirement of it.
Academics: A Duty to Enhance?
If academics are to act as role models for the next generation, then they may 
in fact have a moral obligation to take cognitive enhancers. The intellectual 
and moral shape of the nation in which they teach is arguably in their hands 
as educators. This brings with it a not insubstantial responsibility to fulfil 
160 Enhancing Me, Enhancing You
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2008
their role and discharge any corresponding duties. While it has been noted in 
studies that enhancement drugs are of benefit to “military commanders and 
air-traffic controllers,” Nick Bostrom claims in a letter published in Nature 
on “Professor’s little helper” that
[o]ther jobs are just as important and intellectually taxing—including the 
jobs of many scientists and academics. Anything that can help our brains deal 
better with the complex challenges of the twenty-first century is to be not 
only welcomed but actively sought. (Bostrom 2008)
To amplify this point, it is clear that there is an expectation upon the 
researchers and lecturers in our academic institutions not only to be com-
petent in their roles, but to excel in them. It is not acceptable for them to 
sit comfortably on their laurels, happy with the knowledge and skills they 
have attained thus far in life. As part of their jobs, they are supposed to be 
constantly in pursuit of new knowledge or ways to push the bounds in their 
chosen fields. They currently do so through the development and expan-
sion of their knowledge and skills base, including those needed for teaching, 
researching, publishing, presenting, obtaining and managing research grants, 
and public engagement activities. In this way they are continually improving 
and expanding both their cognitive and other abilities. These more tradi-
tional means of cognitive enhancement are undoubtedly helped chemically 
through imbibing unhealthy amounts of caffeine. The constant improvement 
and augmentation of their abilities helps them to be intellectually sharper, 
perform better at tasks, and produce higher level research.
The point that I am making is that it is not simply considered to be a matter 
of personal preference whether or not academics take the necessary steps to 
fulfil and excel in their roles; it is seen, by both the institutions that employ 
them and society at large, as an obligation that is part and parcel of the job. 
In this respect, cognitive enhancement in academia may be considered a duty. 
It is one that is generated by virtue of the role that academics have taken on. 
It is an obligation generated by the special relationship that they have both 
directly to their students in their role as educators and more generally to soci-
ety in their role as researchers. It is an obligation to produce the best possible 
kind of research and deliver the best possible teaching.
If we are content that our cognitive development as academics through 
skills development, training, and the attainment of knowledge is a duty by 
virtue of the role we have taken on, then, when other methods become avail-
able that can also enhance our cognitive abilities, the employment of these 
might also be part of that duty (given, of course, that the chemical compound 
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is safe). I acknowledge that there will be those who may disagree with my 
characterization of both the responsibilities incumbent upon individual aca-
demics and the strength of the duties generated by these responsibilities, but 
that is going to have to be a debate for another occasion.
A Final Word
I have argued that the use of enhancement-type drugs in the academic setting 
is not comparable to their use in sport. The professional academic plays by a 
different set of rules, and the improvement of our cognitive abilities is some-
thing that is not simply desirable, but is in fact expected as part of our roles. 
Academics are undeniably engaged in the business of cognitive enhancement. 
It could even be argued that the business of cognitive enhancement is the rai-
son d’être of our academic institutions and those who work in them. Accord-
ingly, it may well be the case that we have a duty to enhance our cognitive 
abilities in any way possible, including by chemical means.
Having argued for a moral obligation that might fall upon academics to 
enhance themselves, I hasten to note that, while researching for and writing 
this paper, I did not neglect my own duty in this respect. I consumed not one 
but several cups of that most enhancing of beverages: coffee. It does occur to 
me, however, that with modafinil I might have produced a markedly better 
piece of work. At the very least, I might have produced it faster and actually 
met the deadline for the paper.
Note
1. This is unlikely to be the case, however, for modafinil. The price listed in the Brit-
ish National Formulary, which has details of all medicines prescribed in the UK, 
is £55.80 for 30 tablet, or £1.86 per tablet—less expensive than my daily latte.
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